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ABSTRACT. This paper reviews advances in the study of satisfaction i  the 
context of Social Indicators Research. Five developments are considered: (1) 
changes in the conceptualization of satisfaction, (2) advances in the measurement 
of satisfaction, (3) growth of a significant body of comparative data on satisfaction, 
(4) the map of satisfaction that emerges from these developments, (5) resulting 
advances in understanding of the appraisal-process, and (6) developments in the 
use of the satisfaction concept in wider conceptions ofwelfare. 
Social Indicators Research is concerned with the measurement of
quality-of-life in society. The focus is on description: how well 
citizens live ('level' of living) and whether life gets better or not 
(social 'progress'). Quality of life is conceived in two ways: as 
'objective' and as ' subjective' quality of life. 
'Objective' quality-of-life is the degree to which living-conditions 
meet observable criteria of the good life, such as: income security for 
everybody, safety in the street, good health care, education, etc. In 
this context he prefix 'objective' refers to the way of measurement. 
Measurement is based on explicit criteria of success that can be 
applied by impartial outsiders. 
'Subjective' quality of life is how people appreciate their life 
personally. For example, how secure they think their income is, how 
safe they feel in the street, how satisfied they are with their health 
and education, etc. Here the prefix 'subjective' means that criteria for 
judgement may vary from person to person. In this case, standards 
are not explicit, and external judgement is not possible. 
Subjective appraisals often involve judgements in terms of 
'satisfaction'. That is: summary evaluations of how well one likes 
something. Satisfaction isa central concept in research on subjective 
quality-of-life. All quality-of-life surveys involve questions on the 
matter. 
This paper is about the concept of satisfaction in Social Indicator 
Research. It reviews five developments: (1) changes in the con- 
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ceptualization of satisfaction, (2) advances in the measurement of 
satisfaction, (3) growth of a significant body of comparative data 
on satisfaction, (4) the tentative map of satisfaction that emerges 
from these developments, (5) resulting changes in understanding of 
satisfaction, and lastly, (6) developments in the use of the satisfaction 
concept in wider conceptions of welfare. 
The emphasis i  on advancements in the study of life-satisfaction 
since the 1980's. Several of my earlier synthetic studies on this 
subject are summarized. 
1. DEVELOPMENTS IN CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SATISFACTION 
The concept of satisfaction is probably universal. Human ability to 
reflect on himself and his situation invites to appraisals of like and 
dislike. All languages seem to have words for satisfaction. 
Notions of satisfaction have always figured in conceptions of the 
Good Life. Typically, subjective njoyment isseen as a fruit of moral 
virtue, and hence as an aspect of quality-of-life. See e.g. Bellenbaum 
(1994) for a review of antique thought. 
In Social Indicator Research, a first conceptual advancement was 
the differentiation between 'subjective' satisfaction and 'objective' 
quality-of-life. In the practice of survey-research this involved the 
replacement of multi-dimensional well-being-inventories by a new 
generation of more specific survey items. At the theoretical level the 
discussion started why (some) objective qualities of life bear so little 
relationship with subjective appreciation of it. This development 
took place in the 1960's. 
Further advancements involved the distinction of satisfaction- 
variants. That differentiation i volved first of all a specification by 
object of satisfaction. Satisfaction with 'life-as-a-whole' was distin- 
guished from satisfaction with 'life-domains', such as satisfaction 
with: work, marriage or housing. Secondly, adistinction by scope of 
evaluation was introduced. 'Overall satisfaction' was distinguished 
from 'aspect-satisfactions', such as satisfaction with ease of life 
or with variety of life-experience. Thirdly, ways of appraisal were 
set apart. 'Cognitive' evaluations by means of standards of success 
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were distinguished from 'affective' satisfaction as apparent in mood. 
These conceptual differentiations took place in the 1970's. 
The 1980's witnessed a diffusion of these innovations. New con- 
ceptualizations of satisfaction did not appear on the scene since 
then. 
2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MEASUREMENT OF SATISFACTION 
The above mentioned evelopments in conceptualization f satis- 
faction materialized in new questionnaires and survey items. Over 
the years, these novelties have been scrutinized in various ways. We 
can now conclude that satisfaction can be measured quite validly 
and reasonable r liably. 
2.1. New Ways of Questioning about Satisfaction 
In the 1950's, quality-of-life was measured by multi-dimensional 
inventories which involved questions on subjective satisfactions as 
well as on objective qualities, such as 'health' and 'activity'. Sum- 
scores were denoted with names like 'adjustment' (Cavan et al., 
1949) and 'morale' (Kutner et al., 1956). In the 1960's, similar com- 
posite scales were labeled with the terms 'well-being' (Clark and 
Anderson, 1967) and'life-satisfaction' (Neugarten etal., 1961). One 
of the problems with these scales was that he substantive meaning of 
their sum-scores remained unclear. Another problem was contami- 
nation in the correlation with other factors; because these inventories 
covered all the good, they correlated with all the good. 
In the 1970's, several multiple-item scales were introduced for 
measuring satisfaction specifically. These were lists of questions on 
satisfaction with various aspects of life and with life-as-whole. Sum- 
scores were seen to indicate 'general satisfaction (e.g. Rodgers and 
Converse, 1975). The main problem of this approach is again in the 
meaning of the sum-score; though it clearly refers to satisfaction, it 
is not clear what kind of satisfaction is measured. 
One reaction to that problem was the development of even more 
specific inventories. An example of that kind is Diener's Satisfac- 
tion With Life Scale SWLS (Diener et al., 1985), which involves 5 
questions about satisfaction with life-as-a-whole, that differ in phras- 
ing, but not in content. Similar multi-item scales were introduced 
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for measuring satisfaction with specific life-domains. For instance, 
the Job-Descriptive Index for measuring job-satisfaction (Smith et 
al., 1969), and an 4-item index of marriage-satisfaction by Palis 
(1983). 
The other reaction to the problem of substantive specificity 
was sufficing with single questions. That latter approach became 
dominant, in particular when it appeared that single questions on 
satisfaction work about equally well. 
2.2. Growing Trust in Validity of Satisfaction-Reports 
Since the first attempts to assess public satisfaction by means of 
surveys, there is doubt about the value of responses to standard 
questions. Skepticism draws on different qualms. Most of these can 
be discarded by now. 
In the phase of multi-dimensional adjustment inventories, the 
major uncertainty was their substantive meaning. Factor analytic 
studies howed strong common factors in the responses ofsuch ques- 
tionnaires, but it remained often obscure what reality these represent. 
That problem was side-stepped when questions came to focus on 
satisfaction specifically. 
Then, the question arose whether people who say they are satis- 
fied, really feel satisfied. Several claims to the contrary have been 
raised, in particular about responses to questions on life-satisfaction. 
Various studies have checked these doubts empirically. Both global 
validity checks and checks of specific objections have been per- 
formed. No evidence of invalidity appears. Elsewhere, I have 
reviewed validity tests of life-satisfaction items (Veenhoven, 1984, 
1993b). The main points are summarized below. See also Section 
4.1. 
Specific validity checks 
One of the misgivings i that most people have no opinion about heir 
satisfaction with life. They would be more aware of how satisfied 
they are expected to be, and report hat instead. Though this may 
happen incidentally, it appears not to be the rule. Most people know 
quite well whether or not they enjoy life. Eight out of ten Americans 
think of it every week. Responses on questions about life-satisfaction 
tend to be prompt. Non-response on these items tends to be low; 
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both absolutely (+ 1%) and relatively to other attitudinal questions. 
'Don't know' responses are infrequent as well. 
A related assertion is that respondents mix up how satisfied they 
actually are, with how satisfied other people think they are, given 
their life-situation. If so, people considered to be well off would 
typically report high life-satisfaction, and people regarded as dis- 
advantaged should follow suit with low satisfaction-reports. That 
pattern does occur, but it is not general. For instance, in The Nether- 
lands good eduction is seen as required for a good life, but the highly 
educated appear slightly less satisfied with life in comparison to their 
less educated counterparts. 
Another objection concerns the presence of systematic bias in 
responses. It is assumed that questions on life-satisfaction are inter- 
preted correctly, but that the responses are often false. People who 
are actually dissatisfied with their life would answer that they are 
contented. Both ego-defense and social-desirability are said to cause 
such distortions. This bias is seen to manifest i self in over-report of 
contentment; most people claiming to be satisfied, and most perceiv- 
ing themselves a  happier than average. Another indication of bias is 
seen in the finding that psychosomatic complaints are not uncommon 
among the satisfied. These observations are correct, but the findings 
allow other interpretations a  well. Firstly, the fact that more people 
say to be satisfied than dissatisfied oes not imply over-report of 
satisfaction. It is quite possible that most people are truly satisfied 
with life (some reasons will be discussed in Section 4.1). Secondly, 
there are also good reasons why most people think that they are 
more satisfied than average. One such reason is that we underesti- 
mate satisfaction of our fellow-man, because misery is more salient 
than prosperity. Thirdly, the occurrence of head-aches and worries 
among the satisfied oes not prove response distortion. Life can be 
a sore trial some times, but still be satisfying on a balance. 
The proof of the pudding is in demonstrating the response distor- 
tion itself. Some clinical studies have tried to do so by comparing 
responses to single direct questions with ratings based on depth 
interviews and projective tests. The results are generally not much 
different from responses to single direct question posed by an anony- 
mous interviewer. 
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Global validity checks 
The first attempts to assess the validity of responses to questions 
on satisfaction were tests for concurrent validity. It was checked 
whether satisfaction correlates with factors to which it was expected 
to be related. Typically, this involved the correspondence b tween 
objective situation and the subjective appraisal of it; e.g. income- 
position and income-satisfaction. Such correlations were typically 
lower than expected, in particular in the case of life-satisfaction. It 
took some time to understand why situations deemed beneficial are 
not always atisfying (to be discussed in Section 4.4.2). That insight 
caused a shift to substantive validity-testing. 
A qualitative approach to assessing substantive alidity is consid- 
ering face-validity. That is: close reading of questions and response- 
scales, in order to assess whether they clearly refer to subjective 
satisfaction. I myself performed such a check on indicators of 
life-satisfaction (Veenhoven, 1984, ch. 4). I was met with a lot of 
dubious items, but noticed that several frequently used questions can 
hardly be misinterpreted. 
A common quantitative method is congruent-validity testing. That 
is: computing correspondence in responses to different indicators of 
the same thing. Correlations between different questions on life- 
satisfaction appear to vary between +0.40 to +0.70 (Veenhoven, 
1994b, pp. 825-869). A problem with such data is that correlations 
reflect not only common valid variance, but also measurement error. 
Recent developments in the use of multitrait-multimethod (MTMM) 
designs allows separation of these effects. A recent cross-national 
MTMM-study on satisfaction found an average validity coefficient 
of 0.94, which is quite high (Saris and Veenhoven, 1996; Scherpen- 
zeel, 1995, p. 132). 
2.3. New Tools to Improve Reliability 
Though specific questions on satisfaction seem to measure what they 
are supposed to measure, there is evidence that hey measure itrather 
imprecisely. When the same question is asked twice in an interview, 
responses are not always identical. Correlations are about +0.70. 
Over a period of a week, test-retest reliability drops to circa +0.60. 
Though responses eldom change from 'satisfied' to 'dissatisfied', 
switches from 'very' to 'fairly' are rather common. The difference 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SATISFACTION-RESEARCH 7 
between response-options is often ambiguous, and the respondent's 
notion about higher satisfaction tends to be global. Thus, the choice 
for one answer or the other is sometimes haphazard. 
Because choice is often arbitrary, subtle differences in interro- 
gation can exert considerable effect. Variations in place where the 
interview is held, characteristics of the interviewer, sequence of 
questions and precise wording of the key-item can tip the scale to 
one response or the other. Such effects can occur in different phases 
of the response process; in the consideration of the answer, as well 
as in the communication f it. 
Though most people have an idea of how satisfied they are, 
responding to questions on this matter involves more than just bring- 
ing up an earlier judgement from memory. For the most part, memory 
only indicates a range of satisfaction. Typically, the matter is 
re-assessed in an instant judgement. This re-appraisal may be limited 
to recent change (are there any reasons to be more or less satisfied 
than I used to be?), but it can also involve quick re-evaluation (what 
is the balance of my sorrows and blessings?). In making such instant 
judgements, people use various heuristics. These mental simplifica- 
tions are attended with specific errors. For instance, the 'availability' 
heuristic involves orientation on pieces of information that happen 
to be readily available. If the interviewer is in a wheelchair, the 
benefit of good health is made salient. Respondents in good health 
will then rate their life-satisfaction somewhat higher, and the corre- 
lation of life-satisfaction ratings with health variables will be more 
pronounced. Several of these effects have been demonstrated by 
Schwarz and Strack (1987, 1991). 
Once a respondent has formed a private judgement, he next step 
is to communicate it.At this stage, reports can be biassed in various 
ways as well. One source of bias is inherent to semantics; respondents 
interpret words differently and some interpretations may be empha- 
sized by earlier questions. For example, questions on 'satisfaction' 
are more likely to be interpreted as referring to 'contentment' when 
preceded by questions on success in work, rather than forerun by 
items on mood. Another source of response-bias is found in con- 
siderations of self-presentation and social-desirability. Self-rating of 
life-satisfaction tends to be slightly higher in personal interviews 
than on anonymous questionnaires. However, direct contact with 
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an interviewer do not always inflate satisfaction rating. If the inter- 
viewer is in a wheel-chair, modest self-presentation s encouraged. 
Much of these biases are random, and are balanced out in large 
samples. In this case, imprecision of individual observations does not 
affect he accuracy of satisfaction-averages, which are most crucial 
in Social Indicators Research. However, random measurement bias 
does attenuate correlations, and may be partly responsible for the 
surprisingly low correlations between 'objective' and 'subjective' 
indicators of welfare. 
Still, some biases are systematic; especially the ones produced by 
technique of interrogation and sequence of questions. Biases of the 
latter kind affect he reliability of distributional data. In principle they 
do not affect correlations, unless the measurement of the correlate is 
biassed in the same way (correlated error). 
As noted above, measurement bias can be identified by means 
of 'multitrait-multimethod' studies. The study of Saris identified 
several method effects indeed. Still, reliability coefficients are in 
the range of 0.85, which is only slightly lower than the validity 
coefficients mentioned above (Saris and Veenhoven 1996). 
The MTMM approach opens new ways to improve validity and 
reliability of satisfaction measures. 
Firstly, it helps to select he modes of interrogation that involve 
least bias. For instance, the above-mentioned MTMM-study suggests 
that satisfaction can best be assessed by means of mailed ques- 
tionnaires, in which questions on satisfaction are positioned in the 
middle, which use items that describe the matter at some length and 
provide a 4 to 5 point response-scale (Scherpenzeel, 1995, pp. 135- 
136). 
Secondly, the obtained coefficients of validity and reliability 
can be used to estimate 'true' correlations. If artefactually owered 
by imperfect validity and/or random error, the correlations can be 
upgraded (disattenuated). To the extend that they are inflated by 
correlated error, correlations can be reduced. Such corrections results 
in a more precise view on correlates of satisfaction (to be discussed 
in Section 4.4). 
DEVELOPMENTS IN SATISFACTION-RESEARCH 9 
2.4. Growing Trust in Comparability across Nations 
One of the aims of Social Indicators Research is to assess whether 
quality-of-life in the country is better or worse than in comparable 
lands. When quality-of-life ismeasured by satisfaction, this requires 
that satisfaction ratings are comparable across borders. There is 
doubt that this requirement is met. Reservations rest on theoretical 
as well as on methodological grounds. 
One source of theoretical objection is the so called 'comparison- 
theory' of satisfaction. One variant of this theory holds that satis- 
faction draws on social comparison within countries, and therefore 
cannot be meaningfully compared between countries. This view on 
satisfaction as a relative matter implies that people will be equally 
satisfied everywhere; irrespective of actual quality of living condi- 
tions. A related claim is that satisfaction draws on cultural specific 
standards of success, which have no relevance in different value- 
contexts. In this view, people can be satisfied in a 'bad' country 
that idealizes the status quo, whereas people can be dissatisfied in 
a 'good' country where a critical ideology prevails. More on this 
theory in Section 5.2. 
Another source of theoretical objection is the view that satis- 
faction results in the first place from outlook-on-life, rather than 
from quality-of-life. In this view, people can be satisfied in a poor 
conditions, if culture emphasizes the positive side of things, where- 
as people can be dissatisfied in good conditions when cynical views 
prevail. This theory will be discussed in more detail in Section 5.1. 
Methodological objections hold that responses to survey- 
questions about satisfaction do not reflect true satisfaction equally 
well in all countries. Differences in semantics and variations in 
response styles would render the scores incomparable. 
Studies on life-satisfaction subjected these doubts to several 
empirical tests (Quweneel and Veenhoven, 1991; Veenhoven, 1991, 
1994b, 1995). The results are summarized below. See also Section 
4.1. 
Life-satisfaction no mere comparison with compatriots 
The first theoretical objection mentioned above was that satisfac- 
tion is based on comparison within the nation, and therefore cannot 
meaningfully compared across nations. This view is based on the 
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theory that satisfaction results from social comparison. That theory 
is a 'cognitive' one; it sees satisfaction as the result of a mental calcu- 
lus. Though plausible at first sight,this theory fails several empirical 
tests; at least so far as life-satisfaction is concemed. These tests are 
discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
An altemative 'affective' theory is that we infer satisfaction from 
how we feel generally. If we feel fine, we gather that we must be 
satisfied. If we feel lousy most of the time, we conclude we must 
be dissatisfied. Unlike conscious comparisons between ideal and 
reality, affects are largely unreasoned experiences, that probably 
signal the degree to which basic needs are met. If so, satisfaction 
ratings reflect something universal, that can be meaningfully com- 
pared cross-culturally. This theory will be discussed in more detail 
in Section 5.3. 
Probably, satisfaction can draw both on affective xperience and 
cognitive comparison. The emphasis eems to depend on the object 
of satisfaction. Cognitive appraisal prevails in case of rather tangible 
aspects of life, such as satisfaction with 'income'. One's income is 
well perceptible and good comparable, whereas one's general affect 
is mostly not very indicative for the adequacy of one's income. 
On the other hand, affective appraisals will dominate appraisals of 
life-as-a-whole. The whole of life is not well perceptible and not 
easily comparable. Really 'calculating' one's life-satisfaction would 
require the consideration and weighing of a lot of criteria. In this 
case it is easier to grasp how well one feels generally. 2 
Satisfaction i  nation no matter of folklore 
The second theoretical objection was that satisfaction reflects the 
dominant view-on-life, rather than actual quality-of-life ina country. 
Consequently, comparing satisfaction-averages would be equating 
apples and pears. 
The theory of satisfaction behind this argument is cognitive as 
well. Satisfaction is seen as a judgement that depends on cognitive 
frames of reference. Frames of reference are supposed to be cultur- 
ally unique. As noted above, the alternative 'affective' theory holds 
that appraisals of satisfaction draw on hedonic experience inthe first 
place, which is linked to gratification of universal human needs. 
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Studies on life-satisfaction have checked several predications of 
folklore-theory as well. As yet, all tests are negative. See Section 
5.1. 
No evidence of cultural measurement bias 
Methodological objections involve various claims about differen- 
tial distortion in responses to questions about satisfaction. Several 
of these assertions have been tested in studies on life-satisfaction. 
Again, the results are negative as yet. 
Single semantics. The most common objection holds that differences 
in language hinder comparison. Words like 'happiness' and 'satis- 
faction' would not have the same connotations in different tongues. 
Questions using such terms would therefore measure slightly differ- 
ent matters. 
That hypothesis was checked by comparing the rank-orders pro- 
duced by three kinds of questions on life-satisfaction: a question 
about 'happiness', a question about 'satisfaction' with life and a 
question that invites to a rating between 'best' and 'worst possi- 
ble life'. The rank-orders appeared to be almost identical. Next, 
responses on questions on happiness and satisfaction in two bi- 
lingual countries were compared. This did not show linguistic bias 
either. 
Differential desirability bias. A second objection is that responses 
to questions are distorted by social desirability, and that such biases 
differ across cultures. One of the manifestations would be more 
avowal of life-satisfaction i  countries where happiness ranks high 
in the value-hierarchy. 
The latter claim was inspected by checking whether eported 
satisfaction is indeed higher in countries where hedonic values are 
most endorsed. This appeared not to be the case. As a second check, 
it was also inspected whether eports of general ife-satisfaction 
deviate more from feelings in the past few weeks in these countries; 
the former measure of life-satisfaction being more vulnerable for 
desirability distortion than the latter. This appeared not to be the 
case either. 
Different response-styles. A third claim is that convention in com- 
munication distort the answers dissimilarly in different countries. 
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For instance, collectivistic orientation would discourage 'very' satis- 
fied responses, because modest self-presentation s more appropriate 
within that cultural context. 
This latter hypothesis was tested by comparing life-satisfaction 
in countries differing in value-collectivism, but found no effect in 
the predicted irection. The hypothesis failed several other tests as 
well. 
Culture-specific concept. A related claim holds that life-satisfaction 
is a typical western concept. Unfamiliarity with it in non-western 
nations is said to involve several effects; responses would be more 
haphazard, and uncertainty would press to choice for middle cate- 
gories on response scales, which results in relatively low average 
scores. 
If so, more 'don't know' and 'no answer' responses can be 
expected in non-western nations. However, that appeared not to be 
the case. The frequency of these responses i about 1% in all parts 
of the world. 
These first tests did not settle the issue definitively. Yet, for the 
present we can assume that the observed ifferences in average life- 
satisfaction between ations are not entirely artifactual. 
Good concurrent validity 
The above objections imply all that here will be little correspondence 
between 'subjective' satisfaction and 'objective' quality-of-life in 
the country. However, this prediction is not confirmed by the data. 
Average satisfaction is clearly higher in the countries that provide 
the best living conditions. 
At the life-domain level this is clearly demonstrated in the corre- 
lation between average satisfaction with housing in the country and 
quality of housing as measured by the average number of persons 
per household; r -- -0.46 in a recent survey of 10 European ations 
(Veenhoven, 1996). 
The same pattern appears in a 22-nation study on life-satisfaction; 
78% of the variation in average happiness across nations could be 
explained by differences in material affluence, social equality, polit- 
ical freedom and assess to knowledge (Veenhoven, 1995, p. 54). 
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3. GROWING BODY OF COMPARATIVE DATA 
In its first phase, Social Indicators Research was very much con- 
cerned with assessing status quo. Now that most problems of 
conceptualization a d measurement have been solved, the emphasis 
shifts to comparison. Comparisons through time are made to assess 
whether quality of life improves or not. Comparisons across borders 
are effected to appraise whether we do relatively well or bad. 
3.1. Enlarging Time-series on Satisfaction 
The first representative surveys on satisfaction were performed in the 
late 1940's in some western ations. Most of these pioneer studies 
were once-only ventures. Their measures of satisfaction were experi- 
mental. Hence, few provide a basis for comparison through time. 
In the decades that followed, periodical quality-of-life studies 
came to be institutionalized in several nations. In the USA, stan- 
dard satisfaction items appeared in regular Gallup-polls ince 1948. 
Satisfaction items are in the core questionnaire of the General-Social- 
Surveys ince 1972. In Japan, questions about life-satisfaction figure 
in annual surveys on the State of the Nation since 1958. Several 
West-European nations tarted periodical quality-of-life surveys in 
the 1970's; in The Netherlands its Life-Situation-Surveys in 1977 
and in Germany its Wohlfahrts-Surveys in 1978. The EU began its 
bi-annual 'Eurobarometer' surveys in 1973. Since the 1980's this 
programma lso follows satisfaction in the new South-European 
member-states Greece, Spain and Portugal. 
Over the years, these surveys have produced considerable time- 
series. The longest series are now available for the USA (45 
years), followed by Japan (35 years) and the first EU countries 
(20 years). These time-series are periodically presented in national 
Social Reports, such as the German 'Datenreport' (SBA 1992) and 
the French 'Donn6es Sociales' (INSEE 1993). National trend-data on 
life-satisfaction have been brought ogether in the 'World Database 
of Happiness' (Veenhoven, 1992b). There are no comprehensive 
international overviews of trends in domain satisfaction. 
3.2. Increasing Possibilities for Cross-national Comparison 
For long, the comparative study of satisfaction was restrained by 
lack of comparable data. Until the 1980's, most analyses were based 
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on no more than a dozen developed nations. In the late 1980's, 
the number of comparable cases grew to 30, among which some 
developing nations. Now in the early 1990's, we can dispose of 
comparable data on about 50 nations, varying in degree of socio- 
economic development. At the turn of the century we will probably 
have data on satisfaction i roughly 80 nations, and cover the greater 
part of the world. 
More identical surveys in ever more countries 
The first cross-national surveys involving items on satisfaction were 
initiated in the USA and effected by Gallup International. In 1948, 
nine western ations were surveyed (Buchanan and Cantril, 1953). 
In 1960 and 1975 world-surveys were performed (Cantril, 1965; 
Gallup, 1975). These were once-only projects. Institutionalization 
of regular quality-of-life surveys at world level has not occurred as 
yet. Still, there are promising developments in that direction. 
As noted above, periodic quality-of-life surveys came to be held 
in most of the rich nations ince the 1970's. Initially, these surveys 
provided little opportunity for cross-national comparison of satis- 
faction, because items differed too much. Over the years, the pool 
of comparable items has grown however, both as a result of sponta- 
neous consensus and deliberate effort o develop standard questions. 
In 1991, the International-Social-Survey-Program (IS SP) included 
the same set of questions on satisfaction i 12 nations (Blanchflower, 
1993). 
Developments in the cross-national study of values involve new 
chances for comparison of satisfaction as well. In the early 1980's, 
the first World Value Survey (WVS1) took place in 22 nations. 
The standard questionnaire of that survey involves many items on 
satisfaction; questions on satisfaction with life-as-whole, as well 
as questions on satisfaction with life-domains. In the early 1990's 
WVS2 was held in 43 nations. Data are available at ICPSR. 3 WVS3 
is planned to cover about 75 nations at the turn of the century. The 
World Value Surveys are not initiated by a supra-national body. 
The program is in fact a successful snowball-project that attracts 
ever more participants from different backgrounds. Probably, the 
WVS program will lay the basis for an international statistics of 
satisfaction. 
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New techniques for comparing scores on non-identical items 
Another promising development is in techniques for transforming 
scores on slightly different questions to a common scale. Such tech- 
niques can be applied only to items that are substantially equivalent, 
but differ somewhat in phrasing of the question and answer format. 
Potentially, such methods can enlarge the pool of data for cross- 
national comparison. Three methods for conversion are used: 
The most simple method islinear transformation. For instance, an 
average on scale 1-6 can be converted to a score on scale 0-10, by 
the formula: difference between the observed mean on the original 
scale and the minimal score on that scale, divided by the difference 
between maximal and minimal score, multiplied by 10. This method 
can be applied on responses to items that differ only in length of 
response scale. It is not suitable for items that differ in wording. This 
method has been applied to data on life-satisfaction (Veenhoven, 
1992b, pp. 115-117). 
Another approach is conversion to a common scale by means of 
judges, who award numerical values to response categories. If agree- 
ment between judges is high, average values per response category 
can be used to compute standard means. If judges of different tongues 
are involved, this method can also be used to improve the cross- 
nation comparability ofequivalent items. This method has also been 
applied on data on cross-national data on life-satisfaction (Veen- 
hoven 1992b, pp. 108-118). 
A last method isthe empirical identification fratio's in responses 
on different items, and estimating scores on missing items by 
polation. For example, regression-analysis of average scores on 
satisfaction-items A and B showed the following relationship: 4 
A -- 0.75 + 0.79 x B. If in a country, only item B has been involved in 
a survey, but not item A, we can still approximate he average score 
on item A. This method requires representative surveys in a lot of 
countries that include the same variants of questions, preferably in a 
multiple-trait-multiple method esign. Such methods can be applied 
only if there is an almost perfect statistical relationship; that is, if 
the cases are close to the regression-line. An exploratory analysis 
of that kind on cross-national data on life-satisfaction can be found 
with Veenhoven (1992b, pp. 98-108). 
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3.3. Onset of Follow-up Studies on Satisfaction 
Most studies on satisfaction are synchronic by design. This seriously 
limits the possibilities for detecting determinants of satisfaction. For 
instance, if well educated people appear to be most satisfied, that may 
either mean that education breeds atisfaction, orthat he satisfied o 
better in school. Distinguishing between causes and effects requires 
panel studies; preferably studies that cover a decade or more. 
Panel studies on satisfaction are scarce as yet, and cover mostly 
periods of a few years. A notable xception is the Berkeley Growth 
Study, which followed a sample white Americans over the life-time 
(Sears, 1977). Unfortunately, the indicators of satisfaction used in 
that pioneering developmental study are not ideal. 
Some panel studies on income-development involve questions 
on satisfaction as well; both the American panel study of income 
dynamics (ISR, 1972) and the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP). The latter panel enters its 10th yearly wave. It has already 
yielded valuable insights in the stability of satisfaction (Landua, 
1992). 
As yet, only one panel study has focussed primarily on satisfac- 
tion. This is the valuable Victoria Quality of Life Panel (Heady and 
Wearing, 1992). This panel covered 8 years. Some of its results will 
be mentioned in Section 4.4.2. 
The available longitudinal data on life-satisfaction are brought 
together in the 'World Database of Happiness', to be described 
below. 
3.4. Better Organization of Available Data 
Mere amassing of ever more data does not yield a better view on 
satisfaction. The findings must be structured insuch a way that rends 
through time and differences across conditions can be identified. For 
long, there was little system in the data. Synthetic studies required 
tremendous work; locating relevant publications, ploughing files and 
reports, converting incomparable scores to common denominators, 
etc. Much of the available information got lost in the dust of archives 
and in babel of tongues. In response to this situation, two kinds of 
data-systems developed; national social indicator systems in which 
satisfaction data have a place, and international databases on satis- 
faction. 
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Satisfaction-sections in databases of national SI-systems 
As noted above, most social indicator reports include time-series of 
satisfaction. However, space in reports in limited and satisfaction 
is not always an issue. Therefore, the data are better accessible if
included in a systematic database. 
An example of a national database of social indicators is the 
German Digital Information System on Social Indicators (DISI). 
This database provides both objective and subjective data on a num- 
ber of domains. The subjective data concern largely satisfaction. 
Time-series range from the 1950's and concern satisfaction with 
life-as-a-whole aswell as satisfaction with various life-domains. The 
dataset is available on computer-file in a user-friendly format. 5
International database of life-satisfaction 
Next to these national collections of data on satisfaction, an interna- 
tional catalog appeared on life-satisfaction in particular. This 'World 
Database of Happiness '6involves three units. 
The data-collection is based on a Bibliography of Happiness 
(Veenhoven, 1993a), which covers the broad literature on life- 
satisfaction. Currently, the bibliography contains ome 3000 titles. 
Most are reports of empirical studies. About half of these use accept- 
able indicators of life-satisfaction. The further catalogs ummarize 
the findings yielded by these latter studies. 
Descriptive data on life-satisfaction are gathered in the Catalog 
of Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven, 1992b). Survey findings are 
presented by question-type; 'raw' distributions as well as averages 
converted to range 0-10. Within item-sections, the findings are pre- 
sented by nation and year of investigation. Currently, the catalog 
covers some 700 studies in 75 nations between 1945 and 1995. 
Correlational data on life-satisfaction are accrued in the Cata- 
log of Correlates of Happiness (Veenhoven, 1994a). These findings 
are presented in small standard-abstracts, which briefly describe 
variables, measurement, population, sampling and statistics. The 
abstracts are ordered according to subject-matter. Within subject- 
categories the data are further arranged by nation and time. The 
subject classification distinguishes between correlates of change in 
satisfaction (assessed by panel studies) and synchronic orrelates. 
Currently, the collection involves ome 650 studies from 75 nations 
between 1911 and 1995. 
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AS yet, no such databases developed for gathering findings on satis- 
faction with life-domains or life-aspects. 
4. EMERGING MAP OF SATISFACTION 
The earlier mentioned advancements in conceptualization, measure- 
ment and data-gathering allow the charting of satisfaction i  the 
present day world. Not only can we now reasonably assess how 
satisfied people are in a lot of countries, but we also get a view on 
changes in average satisfaction through time. Next to average level 
of satisfaction we can chart dispersion of satisfaction i  countries. 
Further, correlational data allow a look at the conditions in which 
people tend to be more or less satisfied. 
4.1. Average Level of Satisfaction in Nations 
The first representative surveys were carried out in Western countries 
and showed unexpected high levels of satisfaction. In the case of life- 
satisfaction, the happy typically outweighed the unhappy by about 
3 to 1. This initial finding raised much doubt he validity of survey 
questions (as discussed in Section 2.2). However, later studies in 
third world nations observed a reverse pattern, especially incountries 
where a large proportion of the population lives at subsistence levels. 
This sad finding met less skepticism, and rendered the high averages 
in rich nations more plausible. 
True satisfaction? 
Still, some social critics are reluctant to believe that people in modern 
society really enjoy life. They rather expect anomy and alienation. 
Consequently, these critics tend to discount reported satisfaction 
as sullen adjustment. Rather than really enjoying their life, people 
would just give up hope for better and adjust o the inevitable (e.g. 
Ipsen, 1978). Various defensive strategies would be used: simple 
denial of one's misery, downward comparison, and a tendency to 
see things rosier than they actually are. Depressives would see the 
world most realistic. The agonies of modern life are seen to manifest 
more validly in alarming prevalence ofmental disturbance, addiction 
and suicide. The main counter arguments in this discussion can be 
summarized asfollows: 
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Firstly, such resignation must give itself away in a discrepancy 
between the 'adjusted' judgement of life and 'raw' affective xperi- 
ence. The appraisal of general affect is less vulnerable to cognitive 
adaptation, because it is a direct experience and thus less open to 
defensive distortion. It is less threatening to admit that one felt 
depressed inthe last few weeks than to admit disappointment i  life. 
Various surveys have assessed both general life-satisfaction a d last 
weeks affect-balance. The results do not suggest that people claim 
to be satisfied with life but actually feel lousy (research reviewed in 
Veenhoven, 1984, pp. 106--113). Time-sampling ofmood-states also 
shows that pleasant affect dominates unpleasant affect in western 
society. See e.g. Bless and Schwarz (1984) for a meta-analysis of 18 
studies. 
Secondly, people are typically dissatisfied with life when they live 
in miserable conditions. As we have seen, dissatisfaction is the rule 
in poor third world countries. In western nations life-satisfaction 
is typically lower where adverse conditions accumulate, such as 
in persons who are poor, lonely and ill (Glatzer and Zapf, 1984, 
pp. 282-397). 
Together these findings suggest hat people tend to enjoy their 
lives once conditions are tolerable. From an adaptive-biological 
point of view this does not seem strange. Nature is unlikely to have 
burdened us with chronic dissatisfaction. Like 'health', happiness 
seems to be the normal condition. 
4.2. Changes in Average Satisfaction in Nations 
The available time-series show a striking stability in average satis- 
faction in nations; both in satisfaction with life-domains and in satis- 
faction with life-as-a-whole. Still there are also cases of profound 
change. 
Trends in domain-satisfactions 
Satisfaction with private domains of life is typically high; at least in 
modern western ations. The great majority indicates high satisfac- 
tion with health, housing, marriage and work. With minor fluctua- 
tions, this high level maintained during the last decades. 
Satisfaction with public matters is typically lower in modern 
society, and more variable. To mention a few examples: Satisfac- 
tion with democracy increased slightly in the EU between 1974 
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and 1991, in particular after the fall of communism (Eurobarom- 
eter, 1992). In Germany, satisfaction with public safety increased 
somewhat between 1978 and 1988, but fell back in the early 1990's 
(Noll, 1994). Satisfaction with environmental protection declined 
considerably in the 1980's (SBA, 1992, p. 577). 
Probably, satisfaction with private domains is higher because 
satisfaction i  these domains is partly inferred from general life- 
satisfaction and mood, which tend to be high in the nations at hand 
here (to be discussed in more detail in Section 5.3). Satisfaction with 
private domains is more stable through time, because it roots more 
in direct experience. Even if the Zeitgeist is critical about marriage, 
people will still judge their satisfaction with marriage on the basis 
of how they enjoy life with their spouse. Satisfaction with public 
matters draws largely on second hand information, and is therefore 
more sensitive for change in public opinion. 
Changes in satisfaction with some domains eem to follow major 
change sin society. For instance, satisfaction with finances decreased 
somewhat inthe 1982 economic recession i  most EC nations (Trimp 
and Winkels, 1989), whereas job-satisfaction rose slightly (Habich, 
1989). As noted above, satisfaction with democracy rose in Western- 
Europe after the deconfiture ofcommunism in Eastern-Europe. 
Trends in life-satisfaction 
In the USA, average life-satisfaction remained remarkably stable 
in the post-war decades. In several other western ations average 
life-satisfaction remained at the same level as well. 
Though constancy prevails, there are also cases of change. Aver- 
age life-satisfaction was low in the war-afflicted West-European 
countries in 1948, but after the successful resurrection it rose by 
about 2 point on a 10 step scale. Changes of similar size have 
been observed in Brazil. Life-satisfaction rose slightly in the South- 
European ations over the last decade. In Japan a gradual rise in 
life-satisfaction emerges as well (Veenhoven, 1992b). 
Analysis of the minor variations in average life-satisfaction showed 
little correspondence with major socio-economic developments. The 
classic example is the USA, where national income doubled, while 
life-satisfaction remained at the same level. Political events did not 
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affect American life-satisfaction either; neither the 1962 Cuba mis- 
sile crisis (Bradburn and Caplovitz, 1965, pp. 122-126), nor the later 
Vietnam war. In Europe in the early 1980's, the economic reces- 
sion hardly affected average life-satisfaction either (Chin-Hon-Foei, 
1989). 
Again there are cases of the contrary as well. The 1973 oil-crisis 
caused aclear dip in average life-satisfaction in Japan (Veenhoven, 
1992b, p. 177). Likewise, in 1962 the tread of a war with China 
instigated a slight drop in life-satisfaction i  India (Cantril, 1965, 
pp. 90-92). Though the 1982 economic recession i  Western Europe 
did not affect life-satisfaction very much, it had some impact in 
the nations that provide least social security (Chin-Hon-Foei, 1989, 
p. 31). 
The changes in average life-satisfaction came only recently to the 
attention. For long the idea prevailed that average life-satisfaction 
is immutable. That erroneous observation i cited several interpreta- 
tions. 
A common methodological explanation was that life-satisfaction 
is not measured adequately. Respondents would indicate how satis- 
fied they feel they should be in the given circumstances, rather than 
express their true appreciation f life. As we have seen above this is 
probably not the case (Section 2.1). 
One of the substantial explanations advanced was that average 
life-satisfaction in a country reflects national character rather than 
quality-of-life. The later discussion of 'folklore-theory' will show 
that this explanation is not correct either (Section 5.1). 
The best explanation for the observed stability of satisfaction is
probably that quality-of-life did not change much in these affluent 
nations in this era of stability. Though the economy grew substan- 
tially, the marginal utility of that advance seems to be modest at this 
level of opulence (Veenhoven, 1989b). 
4.3. Dispersion of Satisfaction 
Surveys not only provide information about average level of satis- 
faction, but also inform about its spread in the nation. Dispersion of 
satisfaction is indicative of social inequality. The more citizens differ 
in enjoyment of life, the more unequal their life-chances apparently 
are .  
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Comparative data on dispersion in life-satisfaction are available 
in the above mentioned 'Catalog of Happiness in Nations' (Veen- 
hoven, 1992b). Exploratory analyses show that differences tend to be 
greatest in the nations marked by low economic development, little 
political freedom and great income-inequality (Veenhoven, 1995). 
Contrary to expectation, dispersion of life-satisfaction appears to 
be unrelated to state-welfare effort. Though dispersion seems to be 
lower in welfare-states at first sight, the relationship disappears when 
economic development is controlled (Veenhoven and Ouweneel, in 
preparation). 
Dispersion of domain-satisfactions ha hardly been studied as yet. 
4.4. Conditions for Satisfaction 
Social Indicators Research does not suffice with describing the dis- 
tribution of satisfaction i society at large, but also tries to identify 
variations in the general pattern; in particular to detect situations in 
which dissatisfaction prevails. One reason is that social policy needs 
information about discontent that is not (yet) voiced politically. 
Another reason is that discontent may reveal social imperfections 
that could be mended by social reform. A more basic impetus for 
searching conditions of satisfaction is that it may help to understand 
how satisfaction differences come about and what they mean. 
As yet, most efforts to identify conditions for satisfaction are 
based on correlational studies. A major weakness of that approach 
is that correlates can be cause as well as effect. As noted above, the 
recent use of panel studies allows a better view on causality (Section 
2.4). 
4.4.1. Conditions for satisfaction with life-domains 
The study of conditions for satisfaction began with analysis of corre- 
lates of domain-satisfactions, in particular correlates of marriage- 
satisfaction and job-satisfaction. I itially, the aim of was to discern 
empirically what a good marriage and a good job are like. But by 
lack of unequivocal findings, the emphasis hifted to exploration 
of contingencies; what kind of people flourishes best in what kind 
of marriages and jobs. Most studies in this tradition do not fit the 
aims of Social Indicator Research. The emphasis i  typically not on 
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comparison across time and nations and data are often not based on 
general population samples. 
Studies on conditions for satisfaction in the Social Indicator 
tradition started with the analogous expectation that 'subjective' 
satisfaction is based on quality of living-conditions that appears 
in 'objective' indicators. The more satisfied people are with their 
marriage, health or job, the better their life in these domains hould 
be. The great surprise was that only a part of the variance in satis- 
faction can be explained that way. For instance in Germany in 
1980, income-level xplained only 15% of the variation in income- 
satisfaction (Glatzer, 1984, p. 64). 
The most common explanation for this phenomenon is in terms 
of comparison theory, which sees satisfaction as the result of a 
match between standard and reality. In this line, it is commonly 
assumed that standards of comparison shift continuously. Adjust- 
ment of standards to reality would produce the pattern of low corre- 
lations. Cultural differences in standards would cause variability in 
correlations. This theory is discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
The explanation is probably most appropriate for distant matters, 
such as satisfaction with govemment. In such cases, appraisal has 
little ground in direct experiences and depend largely on socially 
constructed opinion. The explanations seems less applicable for 
satisfaction with more palpable matters, such as with health and 
with marriage. Though we can adjust o some extend to illness and 
marital conflict, few will really enjoy such conditions. 
A more recent explanation holds that domain-satisfactions derive 
only partly on the reality-objects concemed. Next to bottom-up 
appraisals, top-down inferences would be involved (Diener, 1984). 
Satisfaction with life-domains is partly derived from satisfaction 
with life-as-a-whole. For instance, a happy person will be satisfied 
with his skimpy job, whereas an unhappy person will be dissatis- 
fied with a good one. The former reasons that his job cannot be 
too bad, because he feels fine, whereas the latter seeks exempt for 
his discontent. Panel analysis by Heady et al. (1991) shows strong 
top-down effects. This discovery implies that conditions for domain- 
satisfaction concur largely with conditions for life-satisfaction. 
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4.4.2. Conditions for Satisfaction with Life-as-whole 
A lot of studies have tried to discern circumstances in which people 
take more or less pleasure in life. Review-studies have been done by 
Veenhoven (1984), Argyle (1987) and Myers (1992). The results can 
be summarized in three subject-categories: (1) life-chances; that is, 
opportunity-structures in the living-environment, (2) art-of-living; 
to wit, personal abilities to exploit given chances, and (3) life- 
events; happenings, partly due to good or bad luck. Social Indicators 
Research is typically concerned with life-chances. The relation of 
life-satisfaction to art-of-living and life-events is a typical issue in 
studies on 'health' and 'adjustment'. Contingencies between these 
levels have received little systematic attention as yet. 
Life-chances 
The life-chances studied in relation to life-satisfaction are typically 
social opportunity-structures; environmental matters uch as climate 
and scenery have received little attention as yet. Social opportunities 
for a satisfying life are implied in both qualities of society at large 
and in one's social position in society. A noteworthy discovery is that 
conditions for satisfaction differ more across ocieties than within. 
Quality of society. Life-satisfaction is typically greater in the 
economically most prosperous nations. The relationship follows a 
convex pattern; among poor nations the relationship is more pro- 
nounced than among affluent countries. This is in line with the law 
of diminishing returns. 7 The difference can partly be explained by 
sufficiency of nutrition, but not entirely. Apparently material welfare 
provides more gratifications than mere subsistence. 
Life-satisfaction is also higher in the most socially equal nations. 
That difference is partly due to the greater economic welfare of the 
most equal nations. However, the relationships with gender-equality 
and income-equality remain quite strong after control for income per 
capita. Social inequality involves greater risk of adverse life-events 
and is a source of frustration i  itself. The correlation may also be a 
reflection of related matters, such as suboptimal llocation of human 
resources and a culture of intolerance. 
Average life-satisfaction is also greater in nations where human 
rights and political freedom are highly respected. This difference is 
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partly due to the higher income in these countries, but not entirely. 
Effects of political freedom as such can be better protection against 
injustice and assault. Freedom can also make that people choose life- 
styles that better fit personal needs and situational opportunities. 
Furthermore, life is found to be most satisfying in the countries 
that provide the best access to knowledge, as measured by literacy, 
school-enrolment and media attendance. The difference is largely 
independent of economic wealth. As of yet, it is still unclear as to 
what extent knowledge is a source of satisfaction itself and how it 
works out on other conditions for happiness. 
One of the problems in assessing the impact of societal character- 
istics is the limited number of countries on which comparable data 
on life-satisfaction is available. For that reason, spurious effects 
and conditional correlations can hardly be demonstrated asyet. A 
related problem is that lack of time-series hinders the distinction 
between cause and effects. However, we have seen in Section 3 that 
the amount of data is growing every year. Another problem is that 
current measures of societal quality are very limited; in particular 
the indicators of the 'cultural climate' in countries. Developments 
in the cross-national study of values promises new indicators of 
value-climate in nations (e.g. Schwartz, 1994). 
Position in society. Numerous tudies all over the world have con- 
sidered differences in life-satisfaction across age and gender. The 
differences tend to be small and variable. At this point it is not estab- 
lished what contingencies are involved; for example, why are males 
slightly happier in some countries and females in others. 
Another commonly investigated issue is the relationship of life- 
satisfaction with income. Studies in affluent welfare states typically 
find only small correlations, but in other countries quite substan- 
tial differences are observed. The poorer the nation, the higher the 
correlation tends to be. This pattern does not fit the theory that life- 
satisfaction derives from social comparison, but rather suggests that 
it depends on the gratification of basic needs. This implication will 
be discussed in more detail in Section 5.2. 
The pattern of correlation with education is similar. Again high 
correlations inpoor nations and low correlations inrich ones. Recent 
.studies in rich nations how even slightly negative correlations with 
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level of education. This does not mean that education itself breeds 
dissatisfaction. As we have seen, the most educated countries are 
the happiest. The slight dissatisfaction among the highly educated is 
probably due to a lack of jobs at that level and possibly to the fading 
of earlier advantages in the process of social equalizing. 
There is more consistency incorrelation between occupation and 
life-satisfaction. All over the world, professionals and managers 
tend to be the most satisfied with life. It is not clear as to what 
extent this difference r sults from the rewards of work-tasks, related 
advantages, or selection. 
Together, the above socio-demographic variables explain mostly 
no more than 10% of the variance in individual life-satisfaction; at 
least in rich nations. 
Participation in society. Next to social-status matters, social- 
participation has been considered. Life-satisfaction tends to be 
higher among persons who have paid work, than among the unem- 
ployed. However, housewives are not less satisfied. Neither does 
retirement make life less satisfying. Life-satisfaction is more consis- 
tently related to participation i voluntary organizations. Members 
of churches, clubs and political parties are more satisfied than non- 
members. The same pattern appears in organizational activity. 
Life-satisfaction is also related to presence and quality of intimate 
ties. However, not all kinds of ties are equally related to life- 
satisfaction i  all countries. In western ations, marriage is more 
important than contacts with friends and relatives. Studies in westem 
nations show that children do not add to the life-satisfaction of
married persons. However, among those who have children, life- 
satisfaction is closely related to quality of contacts with their 
children. 
Together these variables explain typically another 10% of the 
variation in life-satisfaction in developed nations. 
Art-of-living 
The strongest correlations concern personal capability in dealing 
with the problems of life. Life-satisfaction tends to be greater among 
persons who are in good physical health and who have a lot of 
energy. The satisfied also share characteristics of good mental health 
and psychological resilience. Curiously, life-satisfaction tends to be 
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unrelated to intelligence; at least o school-intelligence as measured 
by current IQ-tests. However, social skills do differentiate between 
satisfied and dissatisfied. High life-satisfaction is typically accom- 
panied by social assertiveness and good empathy attributes. 
With respect o personality, the satisfied tend to be socially 
extravert and open to experience. There is a notable tendency 
towards internal control beliefs, whereas persons who are dissatis- 
fied tend to feel they are a toy of fate. 
Much of the findings on individual variation in life-satisfaction 
boil down to a difference in ability to control ones environment. I  
has not been established as to what extent his pattern is universal. 
Probably, these characteristics add more to satisfaction i  modern 
individualized western societies. 
The common variance xplained by such personal variables tends 
to be around 30%. 
Life-events 
The effect of life-events on life-satisfaction has received little atten- 
tion. One of the few sophisticated studies that considered the matter 
is the four wave 'Australian Quality of Life Panel Study' by Heady 
and Wearing (1992). 
First of all, this study showed that the course of life-events i not 
the same for everybody. Some people find troubles over and over 
again; they have accidents, get laid off, quarrel with family, fall ill, 
etc. On the other hand there are also people who are lucky most of 
the time; they meet nice people, get promoted, have children who do 
well, etc. These systematic differences inthe course of events depend 
to some extent on ones place in the social opportunity-structure (lif - 
chances) and on personal competence. Favorable vents appeared to 
happen more often to persons who were well-educated and psycho- 
logically extraverted. Adverse events occurred less to people with 
good intimate attachments, but more to neurotics. Both favorable 
and unfavorable events happened more to persons who were young 
and psychologically open. 8 
The study also demonstrated that the course of life-events affects 
satisfaction-with-life. Firstly, it was found that the balance of favor- 
able and adverse vents in one year predicts reported life-satisfaction 
in the next year. The more positive that balance, the greater the 
satisfaction with life. Life-events explained some 25% of the differ- 
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ences in life-satisfaction, of which about 10% independent of social 
position and personality. Next, longitudinal nalysis indicated that 
change in characteristic pattern of event was followed by change 
in life-satisfaction. Respondents who shifted to a more positive bal- 
ance, became more satisfied with their life. 
5. ADVANCES IN UNDERSTANDING APPRAISAL OF SATISFACTION 
Since antiquity there is speculation about inner processes that 
underlie satisfaction. Some of the theories imply that subjective 
satisfaction has hardly any link with real quality-of-life, and pro- 
vides for that reason no meaningful social indicator. By lack of 
empirical data, these disputes remained long unresolved. Presently, 
there is solid ground to reject hese theories. 
5.1. State or Trait? 
Common sense holds that satisfaction is a 'variable state' that results 
from continuous evaluation of life. This view is contested by the 
theory that satisfaction is a 'fixed disposition' to react either positive 
or negative. This theory figures at the individual level as well as the 
societal level. Both variants imply that satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
says little about real quality-of-life. 
Personal character trait? 
The individual level variant sees satisfaction as a personal trait; a 
general tendency to like or dislike things. This tendency can stem 
from inborn temperament, as well as early experience. It is believed 
to shape the perception of separate life-experiences, a  well as the 
evaluation of life-as-a-whole. In this view, improvement of living 
conditions will not result in greater satisfaction, because the valuative 
reaction will remain the same. The discontented will always be 
disgruntled and satisfied will always see the sunny side of things. 
Hence, satisfaction isof little value as a social indicator. 
Origin. The idea of satisfaction as a fixed disposition emerged as an 
answer to several puzzling research results. One of these was that he 
discovery of a major common factor in satisfactions with different 
things; people who are satisfied with their job tend to be satisfied 
with their marriage and the weather as well (mentioned in Section 
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2). Another iddle was the earlier mentioned finding that subjective 
satisfaction is only dimly related to 'objective' social positional vari- 
ables, whereas atisfaction is closely linked to personality variables 
(remember Section 4.4). The explanation was that people do not 
really 'judge' life, but 'replicate' a preconceived i ea. 
Evidence. Elsewhere, one examined the tenability of this theory 
for life-satisfaction. It was checked whether life-satisfaction is (1) 
temporally stable, (2) cross-situationally consistent and (3) innerly 
caused. None of this appeared to be the case (Veenhoven, 1994b). 
Firstly, life-satisfaction does not remain the same over time; 
particularly not over the length of a life-time. Individuals revise 
their evaluation of life periodically. Consequently, life-satisfaction 
changes quite often; both absolutely and relatively towards others. 
Secondly, life-satisfaction appears not insensitive to change in 
living-conditions. Improvement or deterioration is typically fol- 
lowed by a rise or decline in the appreciation of life. This appears 
for instance in the sequela of widowhood and divorce. 
Thirdly, satisfaction is not entirely an internal matter. It is true 
that evaluations of life are influenced by personal dispositions, uch 
as optimism or downward comparison. However, these inner align- 
ments modify the impact of environmental effects rather than over- 
shadow them. 
National character trait? 
The societal variant of this theory (folklore-theory) assumes that 
individual tendencies to like or dislike life are part of a common 
national-character. Some cultures would tend to have a gloomy out- 
look on life, whereas others are optimistic. Such tendencies would 
root in experiences of earlier generations, and be passed through 
socialization. As a result, current satisfaction i a country would say 
more about its welfare in the past than about its present welfare (e.g. 
Inglehart, 1990, p. 30). 
Origin. This theory roots in a tradition of cultural relativism. It 
found support in unexpected differences in average life-satisfaction 
between ations, such as the low level of satisfaction i  France and 
the high level in the USA. The idea was also nourished by the first 
time-series on life-satisfaction. As mentioned above, life-satisfaction 
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remained at the same level in postwar USA, in spite of a doubling 
of the national income. 
Evidence. One checked several predictions of folklore-theory about 
life-satisfaction aswell (Veenhoven, 1992b, pp. 66-79; 1994, 1995). 
The theory did not stand these tests. 
A first implicated hypothesis i that differences in average life- 
satisfaction are unrelated to variation in objective quality of life. 
Five such differences were considered: economic affluence, social 
equality, political freedom and intellectual development. As we have 
seen in Section 4.4, these nation-characteristics explain 78% of the 
differences in average life-satisfaction between ations. As noted 
above as well, there are examples or rise and drop in average life- 
satisfaction following improvement and decline of quality-of-life in 
the country (Section 4.2). 
One also considered the residual variances in regression charts. 
If French national character would tend to understate satisfaction 
and the American way to overstatement, we can expect o find the 
French less satisfied than predicted on the basis of objective welfare 
and Americans more satisfied than their situation justifies. No such 
patterns appeared. Latin countries are not systematically ess satis- 
fied than their level of living would predict. Nor is satisfaction i  
Anglo-Saxon countries typically above that line. 
Still another test involved the analysis of life-satisfaction among 
migrants. If life-satisfaction reflects the quality of the conditions 
one lives in, life-satisfaction of migrants in a country must be 
close to the level of autochthons. If, however, life-satisfaction is 
a matter of socialized outlook, the satisfaction of migrants must be 
closer to the level in their motherland. First generation migrants in 
two nations were considered: In Australia, migrants from Britain, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands and Yougo-Slavia. In Ger- 
many, migrants from Greece, Italy, Spain, Turkey and Yougo-Slavia. 
Folklore theory failed this test as well. 
5.2. Relative or Not? 
If satisfaction is a mental state rather than a trait, the next question is 
how that state is produced innerly. The traditional nswer is that satis- 
faction results from comparison. It is assumed that we continuously 
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assess correspondence of life-as-it-is, to notions of how-life-should- 
be. The smaller the gap between reality and ideal, the more satisfied 
we would be. Standards of how life-should-be are seen to draw on 
perceptions ofwhat is feasible and on comparison with others. These 
standards are thought o adjust continuously. The more money we 
earn and the more our neighbors have, the higher the amount of 
money we would deem necessary for a decent living. Together these 
assumptions imply that it is not possible to create lasting satisfaction; 
neither at the individual level, nor the societal level. 
At the individual evel, this theory predicts that satisfaction is 
a short-lived phenomenon. We would be satisfied when life comes 
close to ideal, but in coming closer to ideal, we would tend to set 
higher demands and end up as equally dissatisfied as before. Like- 
wise, social comparison would impede lasting satisfaction. When we 
have surpassed the Jones, reference drifts upwards to the Petersons, 
and we feel dissatisfied again. This theory has many variations. See 
Veenhoven (1991, 1995). 
At the societal evel, this theory implies that average satisfac- 
tion will fluctuate around a neutral level. Because individual citizens 
oscillate between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, the average will 
be in between. Social comparison isalso likely to result in a neutral 
average; the satisfaction of the citizens who do better is neutral- 
ized by the dissatisfaction f the ones who do worse. According to 
this theory life-satisfaction should be approximately the same in all 
countries. 
These implications disqualify satisfaction as a Social Indicator of 
qualify-of-life. In this view, people can be satisfied in adverse condi- 
tions because they do not know better, and dissatisfied in beneficial 
conditions because of inflated aspirations. 
Origin. This view on satisfaction dates back to Stoic philosophy. 
Contemporary, it roots in reference theory. 9 The underlying cognitive 
vision fits the mainstream of present day psychology. 
Empirical evidence. Some often cited investigations claim support 
for this theory. Easterlin (1974) saw the theory proved by his obser- 
vation that life-satisfaction is as high in poor countries as it is in rich 
countries. Brickman et al. (1978) claim proof in their observation that 
lottery-winners are no more satisfied with life than paralysed acci- 
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dent victims. Elsewhere, one scrutinized these sensational c aims 
(Veenhoven, 1991). The results of that enquiry can be summarized 
as follows: 
First of all, life-satisfaction differs in poor and rich nations. 
Neither are accident victims equally satisfied as lottery winners. 
The differences may be smaller than one might have thought, but 
they exist undeniably. 
Some other implications of theory that life-satisfaction is relative 
failed an empirical test as well. One such implication isthat changes 
in living-conditions, to the better or the worse, do not have a lasting 
effect on life-satisfaction. As noted above, there is good evidence 
that we do not adjust o everything; for instance, we don't adjust 
to the misfortune of having a handicapped child or the loss or a 
partner. 
Another implication is that earlier hardship favors later satis- 
faction. This hypothesis does not fit the data either. For example, 
survivors of the Holocaust were found to be less satisfied with life 
than Israelis of the same age who got off scot-free. 
A last empirical check to be mentioned is the correlation with 
income. The theory that life-satisfaction is relative predicts astrong 
correlation in all countries, irrespective of their wealth. Income is 
a salient criterion for social comparison, and we compare typically 
with compatriots. Again, the prediction isnot confirmed by the data. 
The correlation ishigh in poor countries and low in rich ones. 
Theoretical flaws. The theory that life-satisfaction is 'relative' 
assumes that life-satisfaction is a purely cognitive matter and does 
not acknowledge affective xperience. It focusses on 'wants' and 
neglects 'needs'. Contrary to wants, needs are not relative. 
5.3. Calculus or Inference? 
The above results fit a new theory of how we appraise satisfaction. 
According to this theory satisfaction judgements can be manufac- 
tured in two ways: by 'calculating' success on the basis of standards, 
and by 'inferring' from how one feels generally. Practice would 
depend on availability of relevant cues, which is not the same for all 
objects of evaluation. In the case of life-satisfaction, the available 
cues would entice affective inference. 
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Satisfaction as calculated contentment 
Utilitarian philosophers spoke a happiness as the "sum of pleasures 
and pains", established in a "mental calculus". This view on the 
appraisal process is still dominant nowadays. Satisfaction is seen 
to be assessed in a similar way as accountants calculate profit. We 
would count our blessings and blights, and then strike a balance. 
The judgement is then a bottom-up rocess, in which appraisals of 
various aspects of life are combined into an overall judgement. 
In this line, Andrews and Withey (1976) suggested that satisfac- 
tion with life-as-a-whole is calculated on the basis of satisfactions 
with life-aspects. We would first evaluate domains of life, such as 
our job and marriage, by means of comparing the reality of life with 
various standards of success, like 'security' and 'variation'. On the 
basis of the sub-evaluations we would strike an overall balance, by 
computing some weighted average of satisfactions, in which differ- 
ences in importance of domains and standards are acknowledged. 
Andrews and Withey demonstrate high correlations between satis- 
faction with life-as-a-whole and life-aspect appraisals, but found no 
evidence for the presumed weighing. 
Michalos' (1985) Multiple-Discrepancy-Theory alsodepicts life- 
satisfaction as the balance of various sub-evaluations. In this case, 
sub-evaluations are assessments of discrepancy between percep- 
tions of how-life-is with notions of how-it-should-be. The five main 
comparison standards are presented as: what one 'wants', what one 
'had' earlier in life, what one 'expected' to have, what one thinks 
'other people' have, and what one feels is 'deserved'. Michalos 
provides ample evidence that small discrepancies are accompanied 
by high satisfaction. Multiple regression analysis howed that life- 
satisfaction is primarily afunction of perceived iscrepancy between 
reality and 'wants'. 
Though satisfaction with life-as-a-whole is statistically correlated 
with appraisals of various aspects of life, it has not been estab- 
lished that life-satisfaction is causally determined by these sub- 
evaluations. The correlation can also be due to top-down effects. For 
instance, when assessing his job-satisfaction a person can reason "I 
am generally happy, so apparently I like my job". Panel-analysis has 
demonstrated strong effects of this kind. Actually, the effect of life- 
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satisfaction on perception of have-want discrepancies is greater than 
the effect of gap-size on life-satisfaction (Heady et al., 199 I). 
Satisfaction inferred from affect 
A rival theory is that satisfaction draws on global indications of 
quality-of-life. An internal cue of this kind is how well one gener- 
ally feels; if pleasant affect dominates, life can't be bad (affective 
inference). An external cue is how satisfied other people think one 
is (reflected appraisal). The available vidence suggests that inter- 
nal affective cues are far more important than external social ones. 
Life-satisfaction is much more related to matters of mood than to 
reputation. Reports of daily affect correspond closely to satisfac- 
tion with life-as-a-whole, whereas peer-ratings of life-satisfaction 
correlate only modestly with self-ratings. 
In assessing how we generally feel, we seem to focus on the 
relative frequency of positive and negative affects, rather than on 
the remembered intensity of joy and suffering (Diener et al., 1991). 
A typical heuristic seems to involve departing from the mood of 
the moment, which can be read quite vividly, and next considering 
how representative that mood is for general affective xperience 
(Schwarz and Strack, 1991). 
Appraisal strategy differs with object of satisfaction 
The evaluation-process i  not identical for all objects. Affective 
inference isthe rule in evaluations oflife-as-a-whole, and piecemeal 
calculations most common in some life-domain evaluations. 
Schwarz and Strack (1991) argue convincingly that appraisals 
of life-as-a-whole take bearings in affective xperience. This facili- 
tates the judgmental task. Affective xperience is typically poignant, 
and most people know fairly well how they feel generally. The 
alternative of 'calculating' life-satisfaction is more difficult and time- 
consuming. It requires election of standards, assessments of success 
and integration of the appraisals into an overall judgement. Not only 
does this involve more mental operations, but it also entails many 
arbitrary decisions. Still, some people sometimes choose to follow 
this more difficult road. A condition that encourages calculative 
appraisal is uncertainty about typical mood, which is common in 
depression. An other thing that invites to calculative appraisal is 
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availability of salient information for comparison, such as the earlier 
mentioned interviewer in a wheelchair. 
Evaluations of specific aspects of life can less well be derived 
from estimates of general affect. For instance, satisfaction with ones 
income. Good or bad mood may as well stem from experience in 
other domains, such as marriage and health. On the other hand, 
calculative appraisal is less difficult in this case. The field is easier to 
oversee and the standards are fairly evident. Consequently, studies on 
income-satisfaction show that people judge their income by means 
of comparison-standards andthat reference tends to drift (Van Praag 
et al., 1979). There are also indications for comparison processes in 
satisfaction with health and satisfaction with job. 
Harking back to the above discussion on the theory that satisfac- 
tion is relative, we can now conclude that some domain-satisfactions 
are relative indeed, but general life-satisfaction is not. 
6. ROLE OF SATISFACTION IN CONCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL WELFARE 
The traditional view holds that subjective satisfaction is the result 
of the objectively Good Life; 'objective' both in the sense of moral 
truth and external accessibility. In early European moral philoso- 
phy, the Good Life was conceived primarily in terms of individual 
behavior: the Good Life was a morally proper way-of-life. In this 
view, satisfaction was the fruit of personal virtue. With the Enlight- 
ment emphasis hifted to collective living conditions. Satisfaction 
came to be seen as an individual manifestation f social welfare; the 
Good Life was more or less equated with the Good Society. 
Since then, many attempt have been made to specify what social 
welfare is precisely, and to ground such conceptions in moral and 
social theory. The resulting notions of social welfare are at the basis 
of current social indicator systems. 
Substantially, current conceptions of social welfare have much in 
common; at least in western society. It is generally agreed that the 
good life requires a decent material standard of living, safety in the 
streets, warm social contacts and assess to 'higher' culture. Current 
difference of opinion is largely on matters of degree, such as the 
size of the minimum-income. In spite of this political consensus on 
'what' should be considered welfare, there is philosophical dispute 
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on 'why' we feel so. Legitimations ofwelfare conceptions are much 
contested. 
Welfare-conceptions can be grounded in three ways: (1) in moral 
principle, (2) in public consensus and (3) in human ature. 
The first way is the most common one. Most welfare-conceptions 
derive from moral axiom; much like the biblical Ten Command- 
ments. An evident disadvantage of this principalist legitimation is 
that it rests on conviction rather than reasoning. Contemporary con- 
ceptions of welfare handle the problem in two ways: 
One way is to abandon claims of objective truth, and suffice with 
current ideological consensus. This is the pragmatic onsensualist 
approach. 
The other way is to seek solid ground in universal prerequisites for 
human functioning. This can be called the naturalist legitimation. 
The concept of satisfaction serves different roles in these three 
welfare conceptions. Consequently, the use of satisfaction data is not 
identical in all social indicator systems. 
6.1. Satisfaction in Principalist Conceptions of Welfare 
In this approach, social welfare is the degree to which given values 
are realized in society. The French Revolution proclaimed 'Liberty', 
'Equality' and 'Brotherhood' as core-values. Contemporary creed 
has been characterized as 'Having', 'Loving' and 'Being' (Allardt, 
1971). 
No necessary criterion 
In this conception, satisfaction does not necessarily signify welfare. 
Its role depends on the value attached to satisfaction as such, and on 
its effects on other valued matters. Satisfaction is irrelevant for wel- 
fare if hedonism isrejected on principle, and if no secondary effects 
are seen to be involved. Satisfaction has no place in social indicator 
systems based on such tenets. Possibly for that reason, satisfaction 
questions are absent in Swedish Level-of-Living surveys. 
Criterion of welfare if valued as such 
If however, it is believed is that we can better be satisfied than 
dissatisfied, satisfaction is a criterion in the principalist conception 
of welfare. The most radical position in that line is Utilitarianism. 
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In that moral doctrine, life-satisfaction is the ultimate criterion for 
judging good and bad. The best society is the one that produces "the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number". Freedom, equality and 
brotherhood are of interest only to the extend that they contribute to 
general satisfaction. 
In this view, satisfaction is the core-criterion of social welfare 
and hence the prime indicator of social progress; like national 
income per capita serves as the prime indicator of economic suc- 
cess. General life-satisfaction suits that purpose better than specific 
domain-satisfactions. 
Though well known, this position is not much accepted nowadays. 
Consequently, nosocial indicator system uses satisfaction as its core. 
Still, it figures in other oles. 
Facilitator of welfare if instrumental 
If not condoned as a merit in itself, satisfaction can still figure as 
an instrumental value in principalist conceptions of welfare. Satis- 
faction can serve that role only if its effects on adhered end-values 
are well understood; like in the case of consequences of inflation for 
economic growth. 
However, this is not the case as yet. There is wide difference of 
opinion on the consequences of satisfaction. On one hand, there are 
claims that satisfaction is detrimental to highly values matters; for 
instance, harmful to freedom because it renders people uncritical, 
and pemicious to brotherhood because it feeds selfish hedonism. 
On the other hand, it is asserted that satisfaction i volves positive 
consequences, .g., by broadening perception and encouraging social 
bonds. Preliminary empirical explorations of consequences of life- 
satisfaction support he positive view (Veenhoven, 1988, 1989a). 
As yet, satisfaction ishardly used in this instrumental role. Prob- 
ably, it will be used for that purpose in the future, when we know 
more about its effects. Whatever effects found, the use of satisfac- 
tion in this context will always depend on the end-values endorsed. 
What variants of satisfaction are most appropriate depends on the 
particular terminal values as well. 
6.2. Satisfaction in the Consensualist Conception of Welfare 
The consensualist approach acknowledges moral relativism, and 
grounds on shared values. In this view, social welfare is the degree 
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to which a society realizes its own goals. Criteria for social welfare 
are the issues on the political agenda. The task of Social Indica- 
tors Research is to asses success in meeting these criteria. As goals 
and priorities change over time, social indicator systems have to 
change as well; emerging issues should be timely included. The 
German social indicator system is based on that view of welfare 
(Zapf, 1994). 
In this approach, the concept of satisfaction figures in different 
roles. 
Criterion of welfare if generally adhered 
In the consensualist approach, satisfaction can serve as a criterion 
for welfare, if satisfaction is deemed desirable generally. That is 
typically the case in modem western society; value-surveys show 
high ranking of hedonic values l~ (e.g. Harding, 1985). However, in 
other times and places, abstinence and suffering may be held in more 
respect. In such contexts, satisfaction is not seen as a blessing, but 
rather as a moral tread. Hence satisfaction does not always mark 
social welfare in the consensualist approach. 
In this role, satisfaction with life-as-a-whole is more important 
than satisfaction with specific life-domains. 
Messenger of public preference 
In the consensualist approach, the concept of satisfaction also plays a 
role in reading the public mind. It is used to identify issues of interest 
and to estimate their urgency. The greater the dissatisfaction with 
something, the more priority it is seen to deserves. Trends in satis- 
faction guide the continuous adjustment of welfare definitions. 
Here, satisfaction is again not a criterion in itself, but a mes- 
senger. Dissatisfaction i  particular marks welfare-deficits. Specific 
domain-satisfactions suit this purpose mostly better than general 
life-satisfaction. 
Indicator of goal-realisation 
In the same vein, satisfaction is used as an indicator of advance in 
meeting public demands. If people are satisfied on an average, the 
'general will' is apparently satiated. If not, effort has to continue. 
For instance, proper housing is measured by average satisfaction 
with dwelling, and suitable income by income-satisfaction. Not only 
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is this a simple way of measurement, but it also helps it to bypass 
the difficult problem of defining what a 'good' house or income is 
like. 
In this role, satisfaction figures as an indicator of something else. 
Even if not valued in itself, it still helps to pinpoint social problems, 
in the way smoke indicates fire. In this context, satisfaction with 
specific domains will mostly be more informative than satisfaction 
with life-as-a-whole. 
Check on soundness of public preference 
In the margin of this approach, satisfaction also figures as a validation 
criterion. In line with the classic assumption that the objective good 
feels subjectively fine, it is expected that success in realizing valued 
matters will manifest in satisfaction. If not, there must be something 
wrong. 
As noted above, empirical research as defied that expectation i
many cases; remember the low correlation between objective and 
subjective indicators discussed in Section 4.4. The common reaction 
to these disturbing findings is denial; typically by discounting inves- 
tigations on methodological grounds. Measures would be inadequate 
(remember Section 2.2), samples would be unrepresentative, reports 
selective, etc. An other response is looking for harmless explana- 
tions, for instance by suggesting that the merits of true welfare are 
not sufficiently perceived by all citizens or that ideological pluralism 
reduces correlations. 
A more revisionist reaction is doubting the wisdom of public 
opinion, and suggesting the possibility that highly values matters 
may be irrelevant or even harmful. For instance, that continued 
economic growth will not really improve life and may even impair 
mental and physical health. This latter eservation opens the way to 
an alternative 'naturalistic' approach to social welfare. 
6.3. Satisfaction in the Naturalistic Conception of Welfare 
The naturalist view sees social welfare as the degree to which society 
is habitable for the human kind. In this context, I myself used the 
term 'livability', which is the 'degree to which the provisions and 
requirements of society fit with the needs and capacities of its mem- 
bers' (Veenhoven, 1992b, p. 14). A livable society is not necessarily 
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an ideal society. It may fail to live up to ideological demands, but 
still meet essential psycho-biological needs. 
In the naturalist view, welfare is living in accordance with Human 
Nature. As humans cannot live solitary, their individual welfare 
requires afunctioning society. Any society must provide some basic 
conditions. A first requirement is the meeting of subsistence needs, 
such as for food and shelter. Another class of necessities i  the grati- 
fication of mental urges, such as the need for respect and coherence. 
Next to these universal requirements, ocieties must meet unique 
demands. For instance, specific features of a society must fit with 
the variations on the human pattern it produces in socialization. For 
instance, a society that bolsters achievement motivation isnot livable 
if it does not provide opportunities for excellence. 
A problem in this approach is that one cannot specify conditions 
for the good life in much detail. 11 By their nature, humans are very 
adaptable. Hence they flourish not only in the social en environ- 
mental conditions where the species emerged (hunter/gatherer bands 
in the African savanna), but in many different contexts as well. It is 
not possible to reason in advance which variants of modern society 
will fit human ature best. However, fit can be inferred afterward, by 
assessing how well people thrive in different conditions. If people 
thrive well, society is apparently ivable. 'Thriving well' is another 
term for 'faring well', hence 'welfare'. 
The degree to which biological organisms thrive in a habitat is 
first of all reflected by the spread of the species and by the individual 
health of specimen. In higher animals it also manifests in affective 
experience, the basic function of which is to keep out of adverse 
conditions and to foster moves to beneficial ones. In humans, welfare 
also manifests in its conscious appraisals. 
Sign of welfare 
Social welfare in the sense of 'livability of society' is not directly 
observable; we cannot see 'fit' between human nature and habitat. 
Hence, we must do with manifestations of good fit. Satisfaction is
one of these symptoms. It is a sign that people flourish in a society, 
and hence and indicator of social welfare. Satisfaction isnot welfare 
itself, but its natural concomitant. 
Satisfaction is only one of the manifestations of human thriving. 
Other indications are physical and mental health. Deficient livability 
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of society will undermine health in various ways and drive relatively 
much of its inhabitants in premature death. Relatively much people 
will develop mental disturbances. 
Satisfaction isno perfect indicator of human thriving. First of all, 
affect is no sure sign of prospering; affective disturbance is quite 
common. Secondly, satisfaction is no pure 'intuitive' appraisal. It 
involves also reasoned appraisals, which are liable for self-deceit; 
both individually and collectively. The health indicators provide 
no infallible compass either. Hence, we do wise to consider these 
indicators in combination and conclude that a society is apparently 
livable if its members live long, healthy, and satisfied. 
In this view, not all variants of satisfaction are equally indicative 
of psycho-biological welfare. Unreasoned affect is more indicative 
of fit between ature and environment than calculated contentment. 
Given the discussion in Section 5.3, this marks global satisfaction 
with life-as-a-whole more indicative of welfare than satisfaction with 
separate life-aspects or -domains. 
6.4. Shift in Conception of Welfare? 
Past development ofthought on Social Welfare and related change in 
Social Indicators Research can be described as a gradual shift from 
principalist conceptions to a consensualist approach. Future devel- 
opment will probably involve a growing emphasis on the Naturalist 
view on welfare. Several conditions way to such a switch. 
One such condition is that support for principalist concep- 
tions declines in modern society. Cultural pluralism is inherent o 
modernity. Politically, this manifests in declining support for great 
ideologies; philosophically, in post-modernism. Admitted, there 
are religious-fundamentalist revival crusades, but these movements 
seem to remain in the cultural periphery. Dispute with these counter- 
movements discourages the calling on belief. 
Modernization could undermine consensualist conceptions of 
welfare as well. Though consensus i fairly great in current western 
society, it is likely to decline when cultural pluralism set on. Glob- 
alization will reveal disagreements with cultures where different 
values are adhered. The discussion about inclusion of gender- 
equality in the Index of Human Development may be exemplary. 
Even if modern values win in the long run, discussions will demon- 
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strate that there is no unanimity just yet. The more vocal the dissent, 
the less ground for consensualist legitimation. 
While the above societal developments enhance the market- 
position Naturalist conceptions of welfare, scientific advancements 
raise its substantial attractiveness. Theoretically, the approach has 
won credibility for two reasons. One is that the biological-adaptive 
view on man and society revives in modem sociology and psychol- 
ogy, and is currently applied in ethics as well (Ruse, 1986). Another 
source of credibility is the advances in understanding of satisfaction 
reviewed in this paper, in particular the falsification of theories that 
mark satisfaction as irrelevant (remember Section 5). Empirically, 
the growing body of data on life-satisfaction provides the Naturalist 
approach a badly needed empirical tool. 
NOTES 
i This paper was prepared uring my stay at the Wissenschafts Zentrum for 
Sozialforschung Berlin (WZB), November 1994. 
2 Affectively based appraisals of life-satisfaction may be backed up later by 
adjusting aspirations. Empirical evidence can be found with Heady et al. (1991). 
3 International Consortium for Political Science Research, File No. 6160, Code- 
book by Inglehart (1994). 
4 In this example, item A is Cantril 0-10 rating of life between 'best possible' and 
'worst possible', and item B a question on satisfaction with life-as-a-whole, rated 
on a 0-10 numerical rating scale (Veenhoven, 1992b, p. 104). 
5 Available at ZUMA, Dpt of Social Indicators, P.O. Box 122155, D 68072 
Mannheim, Germany. 
6 The World Database of Happiness is freely available on Internet: ftp.eur.nl 
pub/database.happiness 
7 At the individual level a similar pattern appears; correlations between personal 
income position and life-satisfaction are strong in poor nations and weak in rich 
ones. See in this Section below, under 'position in society'. 
8 Together, life-chances and personality explained 35% of the variation in life- 
events over this 8-year period. 
9 For a review of this literature, see Michalos (1985). 
10 Though highly valued in public opinion, satisfaction as such has no prominent 
place on the political agenda. Unlike 'health', satisfaction is not often mentioned 
as a policy goal. 
11 In the Principalist approach, welfare can be described in any detail. In the 
Consensualist approach, detail depends both on the range of agreement and on 
crystallization of ideas in the public mind. 
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